Climate risk and private participation projects in infrastructure: Mitigating the impact of locational (dis)advantages by Lupton, Nathaniel C. et al.
San Jose State University 
SJSU ScholarWorks 
Faculty Publications School of Global Innovation and Leadership 
7-27-2019 
Climate risk and private participation projects in infrastructure: 
Mitigating the impact of locational (dis)advantages 
Nathaniel C. Lupton 
University of Lethbridge, nathaniel.lupton@sjsu.edu 
Alfredo Jiménez 
Kedge Business School 
Secil Bayraktar 
TBS Business School 
Dimitrios Tsagdis 
Kedge Business School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/sgil_pub 
Recommended Citation 
Nathaniel C. Lupton, Alfredo Jiménez, Secil Bayraktar, and Dimitrios Tsagdis. "Climate risk and private 
participation projects in infrastructure: Mitigating the impact of locational (dis)advantages" Management 
Decision (2019): 51-67. https://doi.org/10.1108/MD-02-2019-0236 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Global Innovation and Leadership at SJSU 
ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of SJSU 




CLIMATE RISK AND PRIVATE PARTICIPATION PROJECTS IN 




Manuscript Type: Original Article
Keywords:
Climate Risk, Private Participation Infrastructure Projects, Major 








We investigate the impact of climate risk on the success versus failure of foreign direct investments 
in private participation infrastructure projects. We also consider the extent to which project-level 
characteristics mitigate such risks.
We study a sample from the World Bank covering 18,846 projects in 111 countries from 2004 to 
2013. We apply logistic regressions to determine the impact of climate risk and mitigating project 
characteristics on project failure.
We find that higher levels of climate risk at the host country level are associated with higher risk of 
project failure. We also find that the disadvantage of higher climate risk is weakened by two project-
level characteristics, namely, the inclusion of host government ownership in the project consortium 
and the size of the project.
CUST_RESEARCH_LIMITATIONS/IMPLICATIONS__(LIMIT_100_WORDS) :No data available.
CUST_PRACTICAL_IMPLICATIONS__(LIMIT_100_WORDS) :No data available.
CUST_SOCIAL_IMPLICATIONS_(LIMIT_100_WORDS) :No data available.
Our research contributes to the current debate about the impact of climate risks on international 
business ventures. We demonstrate that climate risk is a locational disadvantage for foreign direct 
investments in private participation infrastructure projects. We establish that the â€˜fittestâ€™ 
projects in locations characterized by higher climate risk tend to be those that involve host 
government participation in their ownership structure, as well as those of larger sizes.

































































CLIMATE RISK AND PRIVATE PARTICIPATION PROJECTS IN 
INFRASTRUCTURE: MITIGATING THE IMPACT OF LOCATIONAL 
(DIS)ADVANTAGES
Purpose
We investigate the impact of climate risk on the success versus failure of foreign direct 
investments in private participation infrastructure projects. We also consider the extent to 
which project-level characteristics mitigate such risks.
Design/methodology/approach
We study a sample from the World Bank covering 18,846 projects in 111 countries from 
2004 to 2013. We apply logistic regressions to determine the impact of climate risk and 
mitigating project characteristics on project failure.
Findings
We find that higher levels of climate risk at the host country level are associated with higher 
risk of project failure. We also find that the disadvantage of higher climate risk is weakened 
by two project-level characteristics, namely, the inclusion of host government ownership in 
the project consortium and the size of the project.
Originality/value
Our research contributes to the current debate about the impact of climate risks on 
international business ventures. We demonstrate that climate risk is a locational disadvantage 
for foreign direct investments in private participation infrastructure projects. We establish 
that the ‘fittest’ projects in locations characterized by higher climate risk tend to be those that 
involve host government participation in their ownership structure, as well as those of larger 
sizes.

































































Keywords: Climate Risk; Private Participation Infrastructure Projects; Major Disasters; 
Success versus Failure; Locational Disadvantages; Government Ownership; Project Size.

































































“Climate risk is the most important systemic risk for the near future”
António Guterres UN Secretary-General´s speech (2019 World Economic Forum in Davos)
1. Introduction
There is a growing sense that the macro-environment conditions, by which global 
competitiveness of a firm is established, are changing (Tian and Slocum, 2015). Increasing 
climate risk and the costly responses needed to address them are examples of the forces 
changing the global economic landscape (Dell et al., 2014). These forces pose economic risks 
and new costs to countries and firms, respectively, through their negative impact on property 
and business operations (Wittneben and Kiyar, 2009). Extreme weather conditions (e.g. 
droughts and floods) decrease the value of assets (Mithani, 2017), disrupt supply chains, lead 
to suspension of operations, lost revenue, or even firm failure (Oetzel and Oh, 2014). 
Between 1997 and 2016, more than 524,000 people died and USD 3.16 trillion was lost 
worldwide as a result of an estimated 11,000 extreme weather events (Eckstein et al., 2018). 
At the same time, global integration continues to reduce the obstacles to cross-border 
economic activities posed by national boundaries which has led, among others, to an increase 
in cross-border infrastructure development (Doh and Ramamurti, 2003; Preece et al., 2016). 
Thus, despite current trade tensions, some of the most ambitious cross-border infrastructure 
development projects (e.g., China’s Belt and Road) are being undertaken, some even having 
the potential to alter the global economic order. Usually, cross-border infrastructure 
development is conducted through private participation infrastructure (PPI) projects in which 
private investors contribute equity to projects in international locations (Jiménez et al., 2018). 
Although previously out of reach for many international investors, PPI projects have become 
commonplace, as governments increasingly rely on firms to provide capital, and take an 

































































equity stake in the development and operation of the project (Ramamurti and Doh, 2004; 
Jiang et al., 2015). In spite of their popularity, these projects are physical asset-intensive, 
thus subject to the damaging effects of climate (Flyvbjerg et al., 2009). Finally, PPIs are 
increasing in number in emerging economies (Ramamurti and Doh, 2004; Jiang et al., 2015), 
where natural disasters tend to have some of the greatest consequences (Oetzel and Oh, 
2014).
Within the set of known risks to international investment, climate risk, i.e. the higher 
likelihood that a country will suffer an extreme weather event, has not been extensively 
examined1 (Kreft and Eckstein, 2014; Huang et al., 2018). However, its potential negative 
repercussions can be substantial (Oetzel and Oh, 2014), making it necessary for firms to 
incorporate climate risk considerations when designing their strategies. Our contribution to 
this discussion is an empirical examination of climate risk as a critical success factor in 
private participation infrastructure (PPI) projects, which is a prerequisite to building global 
competitiveness for the firms involved. 
Building on the eclectic (OLI) paradigm (Dunning, 1988, 2000; Cantwell and Narula, 
2001) as the theoretical framework par excellence for investigating foreign direct investment 
(FDI), and drawing on previous recent literature on major disasters, we argue that climate 
risk represents a locational disadvantage for PPIs. We argue that this is because climate risk 
leads to increased operational complexity and higher financial expenditures, reducing the 
likelihood of investors to secure the financing of a project, while increasing its operating 
1 By climate risk in this paper we refer to relatively unpredictable meteorological, hydrological, and 
climatological events such as: tropical, local, and winter storms, hail, frost, tornados, river and flash floods, 
land movements, wild fires, and droughts (Kreft and Eckstein, 2014). Predictable environmental changes (e.g. 
air pollution), man-made, or technological disasters (e.g. oil spills, chemical explosions, biological infections) 
are beyond the scope of this paper (Oh and Oetzel, 2011; Oetzel and Oh, 2014).

































































costs (e.g. Huang et al., 2018). However, despite natural disasters being largely outside the 
control of individuals or organizations (Oetzel and Oh, 2014), specific project-level 
characteristics such as host government ownership and project size can mitigate failure 
resulting from climate risk.
We therefore aim to address the following research questions: (1) What is the impact 
of climate risk on the probability of success versus failure of PPIs? And (2) to what extent 
do government ownership and project size moderate this relationship? To answer our 
research questions, we analyzed a sample of 18,846 projects in 111 countries from 2004 to 
2013.
Our paper contributes to the literature by examining new success factors for firms 
contributing to infrastructure projects, namely, the increasing risks posed by climate and 
factors that mitigate them. We thus contribute to, and extend research on location 
characteristics (e.g. Lien and Filatotchev, 2015; Ramamurti and Doh, 2004; Jiang et al., 
2015) by providing empirical evidence that unpredictable meteorological and climatological 
events impact whether projects succeed or fail. We also contribute to the literature on 
organizational responses to host country (climate) risk (Mithani, 2017; Huang et al., 2018) 
by demonstrating the mitigating effects of two project-level characteristics. Consequently, 
our study also provides useful managerial implications for those companies aiming to weaken 
the potential adverse effects of high climate risk in the host country of the PPI.
2. Theory and Hypotheses
2.1 Applying FDI theory to the examination of PPI project success. 
The eclectic, or OLI, paradigm developed in response to the evolution of the 
international business landscape, originally for the purpose of providing an economic 

































































rationale for the existence and dominance of large multinationals (Dunning, 1988; Cantwell 
and Narula, 2001), but later adapted within international business scholarship to focus mainly 
on the location, performance, and survival of multinationals and their foreign subsidiaries, 
(Narula 2010). It aids analyses of FDI, by organising the factors involved into three groups. 
That is, as implied by its OLI acronym, advantages relating to the ownership, location, and 
internalisation of business transactions (Dunning, 2000; Narula, 2010). Our focus is on 
climate-risk as a location-specific characteristic reflecting significant changes in the macro-
environment of international business, and PPI projects as a type of contract joint venture 
representing a newer ownership structure aimed at addressing the infrastructure needs faced 
by many countries around the world, many of which could not complete the projects without 
foreign participation.
FDI in PPI-projects however, exhibits some unique characteristics. First, available 
PPI project locations emerge in response to a range of pre-existing requests for proposal. 
Unlike FDI initiated by multinationals, investors do not, therefore, have a free hand in 
deciding where to invest. Instead, their decision is restricted to a smaller set of potential 
locations. In this respect, the characteristics of FDI locations in PPI-projects resemble 
natural-resource-seeking FDI, where the number of alternative locations is also limited 
(Cantwell et al., 2010). Unlike natural-resource-seeking and other types of investments, PPI 
projects are comparatively shorter-term investments; a characteristic which is comparable to 
international contract joint ventures (Beamish and Lupton, 2016). International locations 
confer both resources and risks to investors, which in turn have both direct and indirect 
implications for FDI project success (Hennart, 1991; Kim and Aguilera, 2016; Nachum et 
al., 2008; Nielsen et al., 2017).

































































Finally, other FDI project characteristics that are often of concern to foreign investors 
are the project size and ownership structure (Brouthers et al., 2008; Tatoglou and Glaister, 
2007; Zhang et al., 2007). Both of these characteristics are especially pertinent to PPI-
projects as once again, and somewhat differently from other FDI, investors may not have a 
free hand in the respective decisions.
2.2. Hypotheses development
Major hazards like terrorism and armed conflict have a negative impact on actual or 
expected FDI performance (Branzei and Abdelnour, 2010; Czinkota et al., 2010; Oh and 
Oetzel, 2011, 2017; Oetzel and Oh, 2014; Witte et al., 2017). First, major disasters increase 
stakeholder management costs (Pek et al., 2018). Specifically, disasters can increase socio-
psychological disruption and lead to chronic community stress (Gill and Picou, 1998) as well 
as social conflict and uncertainty (Picou et al., 2004). Second, major disasters increase 
compliance costs aimed at addressing the causes of the disaster (Griffin et al., 2016). These 
factors amplify uncertainty and complicate ex-ante contract negotiation and ex-post contract 
monitoring and enforcement, thus increasing the transaction costs incurred. Disasters can 
furthermore cause significant damage both to the property of the firm, and to the 
infrastructure network of the country (Pek et al., 2018). 
Climate disasters including droughts, extreme temperatures, and floods, are 
unpredictable meteorological and climatological events that have adverse impacts on local 
economies, firm property, and business operations (Mithani, 2017; Huang et al., 2018). 
Researchers worldwide have documented the negative consequences, including economic 
losses, as well as casualties (Kreft and Eckstein, 2014). As a result, firms need to account for 
the likelihood and severity of extreme weather episodes so to enhance their chances of 

































































survival and avert decline. We argue that the added risk and uncertainty derived from climate 
risk increases transaction costs for PPIs. Even before a project is undertaken, higher climate 
risk will force investors to integrate disaster and recovery planning with development and 
financing stages. Thus, higher climate risk makes it necessary to invest additional resources 
in researching additional safeguards to enhance the survival of the facilities, acquiring 
insurance, and incorporating contingency and recovery plans to mitigate climate disasters 
(Huang et al., 2018). As a result, the operational and financial complexity of the project will 
rise, making it more difficult for investors to source capital prior to building and operating 
the infrastructure. 
We therefore propose:
H1: The higher the climate risk in a host country, the less likely PPIs are to succeed.
Extending this discussion of the effects of climate risk on FDI performance, we argue 
that project characteristics confer advantages that can moderate this relationship. In particular 
state ownership, as in recent years state capitalism and mixed economies have been 
experiencing a renaissance (Bruton et al., 2015; Musacchio et al., 2015), notably in emerging 
economies (Musacchio and Lazarini, 2014). As a result of this trend, scholarly attention has 
focused on state ownership and its effects; e.g. in internationalization, mergers & 
acquisitions, culture (Inoue et al., 2013; Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2014; Kalasin et al., 2019). 
Although prior work has pointed out both positive and negative consequences of including 
government in the ownership of an investment (Lai and Warner, 2015), we posit that 
including host government ownership in a project can attenuate the impact of climate risk on 
the probability of PPI success (versus failure). While the inclusion of government can 

































































decrease the efficiency with which a project is planned, executed, and managed (Sun et al., 
2016). The benefit of having this stakeholder take ownership in the project with the resources 
of the state at its disposal seems apparent. Unexpected impediments to timely completion 
and budget adherence are typical in infrastructure projects, due to their somewhat 
idiosyncratic nature, and so having government resources (especially political) at the disposal 
of the project facilitates ongoing negotiations around expectations. Private investors can also 
accrue social capital from local government connections within the business ecosystem (Joo 
et al., 2017). Not only can this lead to higher returns in the current project, but also in 
subsequent investments. Hence, it is advantageous for private investors to be involved in 
these projects for the longer-term benefits they are expected to confer in the host countries, 
and private investors can thus be more patient for returns from riskier investments (Lei et al., 
2017). 
The inclusion of the government as an investor also increases the legitimacy of a 
project (Meyer et al., 2014), which in turn facilitates creating estimates of the (financial) 
repercussions of climate events, and assistance in recuperating in their aftermath. Deryugina 
(2011), for example, shows that government aid attenuates losses from hurricanes, which 
facilitates the recovery of firms. As a result, firms experience no long-term effects on their 
earnings because host government ownership in a project can facilitate and accelerate access 
to public recovery programs. 
We therefore propose:
H2: The negative effect of climate risk in a host country on PPIs is weaker when the 
project includes host government ownership.

































































Finally, we argue that the negative relationship between climate risk and the 
probability of PPI success (versus failure) is weaker in larger projects. Although larger 
organizations often entail bureaucratic rigidity and less flexible structures (Laforet, 2008), 
which increase managerial complexity and coordination costs (Nooteboom et al., 2007) 
while hurting creativity and responsiveness to change (Damanpour and Wischnevsky, 2006). 
However, in the case of infrastructure projects, it is more likely that large projects are ‘too 
big to fail’ due to their perceived necessity for safety, efficiency, and overall economic 
development. A recent example is the replacement of the 13-foot high seawalls, destroyed 
by a massive tsunami in Japan, at a cost of 1.35 trillion yen (USD 12.7 billion) (Lim, 2018). 
Larger projects consume more resources, in quantity and variety, (e.g. technology, 
human). These projects also tend to incorporate more organizational redundancy (Stan et al., 
2014) compared to smaller projects, whose lower levels of redundancy also limit the amount 
of host country knowledge they can absorb (Kumar, 2009). As a result, larger projects are 
better equipped to investigate more options for mitigating the effects of a natural disaster, 
build the facilities and other physical assets in a way that minimizes their exposure to climate 
effects, create backup facilities, and buy insurance (Huang et al., 2018). Through actions 
such as lobbying, board interlocks with former politicians, and campaign contributions 
(Hillman and Wan, 2005), larger projects can obtain preferential treatment and information, 
both before and after natural disasters occur (Zhu and Chung, 2014).
Finally, participation in larger projects creates new business opportunities with 
positive additional side effects for private investors (Esty and Bell, 2018). When bidding on 
subsequent attractive contracts, investors may be more likely to succeed where there are 
expected benefits from their experience, preferential treatment from host country government 
and other partners, and reputational effects (Lei et al., 2017). To obtain these reputational 

































































benefits, investors are likely to be more committed to projects despite increased climate risk. 
The experience obtained through successfully completing projects will reduce investors’ ex-
post contracting costs in future infrastructure projects, while the reputational effects from 
completing larger projects successfully will reduce ex-ante contracting costs. 
We therefore propose:




Our sample is drawn from the World Bank’s PPI dataset, a source commonly used in 
the literature (Jiang et al., 2015, Jiménez et al., 2018). It consists of 18,846 PPIs in 111 
countries between 2004 and 2013 in which the main investor is a foreign firm, and for which 
data on climate risk are available.
3.2. Variables
3.2.1. Dependent Variable
The success of PPIs entails that a consortium of investors fulfils the legally binding 
agreement to invest funds, develop facilities, and provide the service. Projects, however, can 
fail when the investors or the government terminate the concession period prematurely. We 
measure project success (/failure) by using the status of a project as provided by the PPI 
dataset, in line with the literature (Jiang et al., 2015). The PPI dataset reports the outcome of 
a project as “operational” when it provides services to the public, “merged” when the project 
merges with another, and “concluded” when the contract period has expired. We consider 

































































“operational”, “merged”, and “concluded” projects as successful and assign a value of 1. The 
PPI dataset reports a project as “cancelled” when the private sector investor(s) has exited, 
and “distressed” when the government or the investor(s) has either requested termination, or 
is in international arbitration.2 We consider “cancelled” and “distressed” projects as failed.
3.2.2. Independent Variable
We measure climate risk using data from Germanwatch (Kreft and Eckstein, 2014) 
on the total losses from climate events, in millions USD adjusted to purchasing power parity 
(PPP). This variable is based on the worldwide data collection and analysis provided by 
Munich Re’s NatCatSERVICE; the world’s leading reinsurance company. Data from 
Germanwatch datasource has been frequently employed in the literature as a measure of the 
severity of climate risk a country faces (Burnell, 2012; Rivera and Wamsler, 2014; 
Garschagen and Romero-Lankao, 2015; Huang et al., 2018).
3.2.3. Moderators 
In Hypotheses 2 and 3, we propose that several project-level features can play a 
moderating role in the relationship between the climate risk in a host country and the success 
of PPIs in that host country. First, we test the effect of host government ownership. We code 
this variable 1 when the ownership of the project includes the host government as an investor, 
2 According to the data source, the private sector might have exited in one of the following ways: (1) selling or 
transferring its economic interest back to the government before fulfilling the contract terms; (2) removing all 
management and personnel from the concern; or (3) ceasing operation, service provision, or construction for 15 
percent or more of the license or concession period, following the revocation of the license or repudiation of 
the contract.

































































and 0 otherwise. Finally, we test the effect of project size, for which we use the total value 
of investments subject to a logarithmic transformation.
3.2.3. Control variables
We include in the model a range of project and country level control variables 
employed by several prior studies of PPIs (Jiang et al., 2015; Jiménez et al., 2018; 2019). At 
the project level, the controls include the age of the project, the delay between the project 
closure and the project commitment, whether the project is greenfield or brownfield, if it is 
publicly traded, and whether it includes only foreign investors or also at least one investor 
from the host country. In addition, we control for the sector of the project.
At the country level, we control for the GDP, GDP growth, unemployment rate, and 
level of political stability (POLCONV index). Lastly, we also include dummies to account 
for any unobservable characteristics of the geographic region where the project takes place.
3.3. Analytical Method
Given the binary nature of our dependent variable and the cross-sectional nature of 
the data in the PPI dataset, we rely on binary logistic models as our estimation technique. We 
mean-centre all the variables included in interactions (Aiken and West, 1991).
4. Results
We report the descriptive statistics of the variables in Table 1 and the correlation 
coefficients in Table 2. All variance inflation factors (VIFs) are below the limit of 10 
recommended by Neter et al. (1985). The mean VIF of the model is 2.76. Besides, the 
relatively low correlations between predictors suggest that multicollinearity is not an issue. 

































































We present the results obtained from the logit regressions hierarchically in Table 3. 
Model 1 includes the climate risk index and the control variables. Then, in Models 2–4 we 
include the interaction terms alternatively; so to test our moderating hypotheses.
The results of the control variables in Model 1 show that several project- and country-
level variables have a positive relationship with the likelihood of project success. Similarly, 
projects in the energy and telecom sectors are more likely to succeed; whereas projects in 
water sewerage are more likely to fail. Projects are also more likely to succeed when they are 
located in host countries with a higher GDP and lower unemployment rates. Projects that are 
older, have a longer delay (meaning more time to prepare the investment since the 
concession), publicly traded, brownfield, and include a local investor in the consortium are 
more likely to succeed compared to their counterparts. Interestingly, larger projects are more 
likely to fail. While we argued earlier that larger projects are better shielded from the negative 
effects of climate risk (for which we provide empirical support next), this result shows that 
despite being more protected from this particular risk, larger projects are less likely to 
succeed than smaller ones. Larger projects tend to be subject to disadvantages such as higher 
managerial complexity and coordination costs (Nooteboom et al., 2007), bureaucratic 
rigidity and a less flexible structure (Laforet, 2008), greater organizational inertia (Zhou and 
Li, 2010) and lower creativity and responsiveness to changes (Damanpour and Wischnevsky, 
2006). All of these can contribute to higher failure rates. Similarly, projects including host 
government ownership are also less likely to succeed. We argued previously that including 
the host government as an investor helps mitigate the effects of climate risk (for which we 
also provide empirical support next). Nonetheless, this result also points to potential 
disadvantages related to host government ownership, such as conflicts of interest and 
interference resulting from a political agenda (Sun et al., 2016).

































































The coefficient of climate risk in Model 1 is negative and significant (β = -7.60e-05, 
p < 0.001), indicating that climate risk levels are statistically associated with a greater 
likelihood of project failure. This result is consistent across all subsequent models, supporting 
Hypothesis 1. However, given the binary nature of our dependent variable, and since our 
model is non-linear, the marginal effect does not equal the coefficient obtained in the model 
but varies with the value of all model variables (Wiersema and Bowen, 2009). To be able to 
assess the size of this effect, we need to estimate the average marginal effects. The results 
show that when climate risk increases by one standard deviation, the likelihood of PPI 
success decreases by 1.323% (p < 0.01) and ranges between 1.440% and 1.368% in the 
models including the interaction3.
In Model 2 we find that the coefficient of the interaction between climate risk and 
host government ownership is positive (β = 0.000120, p < 0.001). Hypothesis 2 is therefore 
supported. We supplement this coefficient analysis with graphical analysis (Ai and Norton, 
2003). Figure 2 depicts the average marginal effects of government ownership at various 
levels of climate risk. Projects without host government ownership in comparison to those 
with host government ownership have a relatively steeper slope in the graph suggesting that 
while higher levels of climate risk in a host country have an overall negative effect on project 
success, this effect is mitigated when the project includes host government ownership. For 
instance, when climate risk is at the lowest level of the sample, projects including host 
government ownership have a 91.95% probability of success; whereas projects without host 
government ownership have a 95.74% probability of success. However, at the highest level 
of climate risk, the probability of success drops to 53.36% for projects without host 
3 Results available from the authors upon request.

































































government ownership; whereas it increases to 97.43% for projects with host government 
ownership. 
Model 3 shows a positive and significant coefficient for the interaction between 
climate risk and larger projects ( β  = 9.81e-06, p < 0.001). Hypothesis 3 is therefore 
supported. Figure 3 depicts the marginal average effects of project size at various levels of 
climate risk. Smaller projects in comparison to larger projects suggests have a relatively 
steeper slope in the graph suggesting that while higher levels of climate risk in the host 
country have an overall negative effect on the likelihood of a project’s success, this effect is 
less pronounced when the project is larger. For instance, when climate risk is at the lowest 
level of the sample, smaller projects have a 95.22% probability of success; whereas larger 
projects have a 93.87% probability of success. However, at the highest level of climate risk, 
the probability of success drops to 51.54% for smaller projects and only to 83.25% for larger 
projects.
We also checked that the results do not show any significant change when the 
variables in the interactions are not mean-centred (Haans et al., 2016). Moreover, we tested 
the results when employing a logarithmic transformation of the climate risk variable. The 
results were again in line with those presented in our main models.4
5. Discussion
Our research shows that climate risk can have a critical impact on the outcome of 
investment in PPI. Yet, despite some recent advances on the study of major disasters (Oh and 
Oetzel, 2011, 2017; Pek et al., 2018), the literature on climate risk is still under-developed 
4 Results of all robustness tests are available from the authors upon request.

































































(Oetzel and Oh, 2014; Huang et al., 2018). To fill this apparent gap in the literature, we 
studied the relationship between climate risk and the probability of PPIs success versus 
failure.  The negative relationship we found can be explained by the fact that climate risk, 
conceptualized as unpredictable meteorological and climatological events, increases 
uncertainty and transaction costs for a PPI project, irrespective of extreme weather events 
actually occurring. As the operational complexity and financial requirements of a project rise, 
it is more difficult for investors to secure the financing of the project after they get permission 
to build and operate the infrastructure. Moreover, once the project is ongoing, the operating 
costs are also higher (Huang et al., 2018). 
Our findings extend the theorizing on the locational (dis)advantages of FDI in PPI 
projects, by suggesting to what extent a locational disadvantage like climate risk could be 
mitigated by certain project characteristics (namely, size and government ownership). Prior 
research has mainly focused on institutional antecedents to location preference of 
multinationals (Kim and Aguilera, 2016; Nielsen et al., 2017).  Our study thus contributes a 
novel perspective on a very different kind of risk to the typical political hazards and other 
liabilities of foreignness faced by foreign investors. Furthermore, we relate this to realized 
performance outcomes, namely the success or failure of a PPI project, rather than the 
extensively studied issue of location attractiveness. Given the idiosyncratic nature of PPI as 
a type of FDI, the impact of climate risk could therefore be considered a signal of the 
particular locational (dis)advantages to foreign investors (Dunning, 1988; Cantwell, 2009). 
Complementary to this, we contribute to the literature on MNE investment strategy 
aimed at mitigating risks (Lien and Filatochev, 2015). In particular, the use of international 
contract joint ventures as an increasingly popular mechanism to address infrastructure 
challenges around the world. To date, the discussion on internalization advantages afforded 

































































by international joint ventures has focused predominantly on the choice between wholly 
owned subsidiaries and joint ventures of varying ratios of foreign to domestic ownership (e.g. 
Hennart, 1991; Majocchi et al., 2013). The viable alternative of comparatively shorter-term 
international contract joint ventures has been under-studied in this discussion (Beamish & 
Lupton, 2016) and so our study will hopefully inspire jumping off points for authors studying 
their role in the evolving landscape of multinational business. We found that projects 
involving host government ownership, attenuate the negative effects of climate risk on the 
probability of PPI project success versus failure. This could be explained by a preferential 
treatment of the project by the government; e.g. in terms of providing information about the 
forecast of the occurrence of natural disasters and the extent of repercussions, as well as any 
planned recovery actions if disasters actually occur (Ridge et al., 2017). Likewise, 
preferential treatment may be granted to investors in government-owned projects; fostering 
the determination of such investors to see the project to its successful conclusion. 
Government ownership can also make it easier for the project to obtain financial aid if 
necessary (Deryugina, 2011). Furthermore, the extent to which the participation of MNEs in 
high climate risk PPI project locations leads to a higher probability of winning similar 
contracts should be studied, as this is a logical determinant of the type of capacity 
development that may be necessary to build global leadership in a changing environment 
(Tian and Slocum, 2015).
We also obtained empirical evidence that the effects of climate risk on the probability 
of success versus failure in PPIs are attenuated in larger projects, as these may have a greater 
amount and variety of resources and slack at their disposal (Stan et al., 2014). Investors can 
leverage these additional resources to select a site which is less susceptible to the impact of 
climate, protect physical assets, and buy insurance against natural hazards (Huang et al., 

































































2018), or implement political strategies to obtain government support (Zhu and Chung, 
2014). Large projects can lead to positive reputational effects, which in turn lead to higher 
risk tolerance and greater determination to achieve success on the part of private investors. 
Similar to projects including host government ownership, this can lead investors to consider 
the additive advantages of experiential learning and gains from preferential treatment in 
subsequent projects, when evaluating the overall PPI benefits.
Finally, this study contributes to the literature on PPI investments (Ramamurti and 
Doh, 2004; Jiang et al., 2015). We explain that the negative effect of unpredictable 
meteorological and climatological events is due to the increased burdens that investors can 
encounter during the planning, development, and financing stages; and potential recovery 
later on. Thus, climate risk can jeopardize the success of projects not only by the direct effect 
of physical damages on an already operational project, but also by preventing the conditions 
required by the investors to implement the project. Finally, our study adds to the risk–
performance literature on major disasters (Oh and Oetzel, 2011, 2017; Pek et al., 2018), and 
climate risk in particular (Mithani, 2017; Huang et al., 2018). We offer a finer-grained 
analysis of this relationship in PPIs, and demonstrate the extent to which alternative 
consortium compositions can reduce project failure. 
5.1. Managerial Relevance
Despite natural disasters being considered largely uncontrollable “acts of God” 
(Oetzel and Oh, 2014), we propose two project characteristics in PPIs that can help managers 
buffer the investment from the impact of climate risk. This can be helpful when managers 
are considering whether to invest in locations characterized by both a high level of climate 
risk and high market attractiveness. Specifically, firms planning to become investors in PPI 

































































projects located in countries characterized by high levels of climate risk, should prioritize 
partnering with the host government and conduct larger-scale projects, in order to partially 
mitigate the adverse effects of climate risk. An important practical implication for policy-
makers is that governments needing private investors in infrastructure can signal 
commitment to the projects and increase attractiveness for investors. Similarly, governments 
might attract larger investments by bundling multiple projects.
5.2. Limitations and Avenues for Future Research
We acknowledge that our paper is subject to several limitations, which open interesting 
avenues for future research. First, we analyse the impact of our variables on PPI project 
success. However, these could also affect additional FDI aspects such as profitability and 
reinvestment. Similarly, future research can build upon these ideas by considering the 
strategies of firms in other kinds of FDI (e.g. in manufacturing). Second, in this paper we 
focus on climate risk, conceptualized as unpredictable meteorological and climatological 
events. However, the literature on major risks has identified other potential sources of 
uncertainty for investors, such as technological disasters, terrorism, and war (Branzei and 
Abdelnour, 2010; Czinkota et al., 2010; Oh and Oetzel, 2011, 2017; Oetzel and Oh, 2014; 
Pek et al., 2018). Future studies can analyse how these types of risks affect PPIs. Third, we 
are unable to distinguish between the effects of different types of natural disasters (e.g. the 
specific effect of droughts, extreme temperatures, floods). Fourth, due to data availability 
restrictions, we measured host government ownership with a dummy variable. Studying the 
effects of different percentages of host government ownership constitutes a promising next 
step to enlarge our research. Finally, data availability in the PPI dataset also prevented us 

































































from conducting a panel data analysis, but it would be very interesting to check if our cross-
sectional estimates hold in longitudinal studies.
Despite the aforementioned limitations, we believe our paper contributes a nuanced 
understanding of climate risk as a locational (dis)advantage for FDI, while also signposting  
some fruitful directions for private investors and governments to prepare in order to better 
address this particular type of external source of risk. Yet, more effort is needed to understand 
how major disasters affect FDI and PPI projects, and thus, we cannot but encourage other 
scholars to continue this line of investigation so to deepen our knowledge in this area.
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Figure 1. Conceptual Framework










































































Table 1. Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Successful 18,846 0.935 0.246 0 1
East Asia 18,846 0.081 0.273 0 1
Central Europe 18,846 0.050 0.219 0 1
Middle East and North Africa 18,846 0.292 0.454 0 1
South Asia 18,846 0.360 0.480 0 1
Sub-Saharan Africa 18,846 0.123 0.328 0 1
Latin America 18,846 .0945 .2925 0 1
Energy 18,846 0.217 0.412 0 1
Telecom 18,846 0.721 0.448 0 1
Transport 18,846 .0326 .1776 0 1
Water sewerage 18,846 0.028 0.166 0 1
Total investment 18,846 3.080 2.59 -0.693 13.97
Age 18,846 4.298 2.419 1 10
Delay 18,846 7.432 6.134 0 23
Publicly traded 18,846 0.107 0.309 0 1
Greenfield 18,846 0.819 0.384 0 1
Host government ownership 18,846 0.274 0.446 0 1
Host country POLCONV 18,846 0.240 0.241 0 0.837
GDP 18,846 10.87 1.041 0 12.93
GDP growth 18,846 5.887 5.100 -33.1 34.5
Unemployment 18,846 4.852 6.555 0 37.6
Local investor 18,846 0.101 0.302 0 1
Climate risk 18,846 2026.78 9059.61 0 75474.21































































Table 2. Correlation matrix and VIFs
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 VIF
1, Successful 1 -
2. East Asia -0.23* 1 2.48
3. Central Europe -0.01 -0.06* 1 1.53
4. Middle East 0.03* -0.19* -0.14* 1 4.11
5. South Asia 0.06* -0.22* -0.17* -0.48* 1 4.79
6. Sub-Saharan Africa 0.06* -0.11* -0.06* -0.24* -0.28* 1 2.76
7. Energy -0.12* 0.37* 0.09* 0.09* -0.35* -0.15* 1 7.09
8. Telecom 0.39* -0.38* -0.07* -0.13* 0.36* 0.18* -0.84* 1 8.51
9. Water sewerage -0.39* 0.08* -0.01* 0.15* -0.12* -0.06* -0.09* -0.27* 1 2.01
10. Total investment -0.14* 0.08* 0.06* 0.23* -0.45* 0.14* 0.27* -0.32* 0.04* 1 1.77
11. Age -0.05* 0.00 0.06* -0.02* 0.04* -0.17* -0.20* 0.11* 0.10* 0.08* 1 1.78
12. Delay 0.29* -0.27* -0.01* -0.33* 0.38* 0.01* -0.29* 0.42* -0.19* -0.23* -0.30* 1 2.38
13. Publicly traded 0.08* -0.08* 0.09* -0.19* 0.29* -0.12* -0.10* 0.13* -0.05* -0.00 -0.02* 0.39* 1 2.45
14. Greenfield -0.08* -0.03* -0.15* 0.19* -0.05* 0.09* -0.08* 0.15* -0.08* 0.05* 0.00 -0.22* -0.60* 1 2.2
15. Host government ownership -0.02* -0.07* 0.03* -0.23* 0.21* -0.04* -0.07* 0.01* 0.13* -0.04* 0.10* 0.22* 0.44* -0.45* 1 1.55
16. Host POLCONV -0.12* 0.09* 0.29* -0.24* -0.24* 0.19* 0.23* -0.28* 0.11* 0.16* -0.08* 0.04* 0.07* -0.24* 0.01* 1 1.86
17. GDP -0.09* 0.13* 0.01 0.02* -0.15* -0.06* 0.24* -0.28* 0.08* 0.20* -0.28* 0.10* 0.12* -0.14* 0.00 0.24* 1 1.63
18. GDP growth 0.02* -0.03* -0.05* 0.08* 0.06* -0.05* 0.15* -0.11* -0.03* -0.01* -0.11* -0.15* -0.19* 0.16* -0.07* -0.22* 0.29* 1 1.57
19. Unemployment -0.05* -0.04* 0.15* 0.29* -0.38* -0.05* -0.06* -0.00 0.13* 0.38* 0.36* -0.16* -0.12* 0.03* 0.00 0.03* -0.10* -0.26* 1 1.86
20. Local investor -0.12* 0.38* 0.01 -0.21* -0.02* 0.01 0.18* -0.15* -0.04* 0.02* 0.08* -0.15* -0.08* 0.01 -0.17* 0.29* 0.04* -0.08* -0.09* 1 1.5
21. Climate risk -0.43* 0.44* -0.04* -0.14* -0.01 -0.08* 0.19* -0.18* 0.03* -0.04* -0.09* -0.03* 0.02* -0.01 -0.03* 0.07* 0.14* 0.02* -0.11* 0.30* 1 1.35
* p<0.05

































































Table 3. Logit regression result
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Base Government ownership Project Size
East Asia 0.832*** 0.749*** 0.785***
(0.213) (0.213) (0.214)
Central Europe -1.271*** -1.283*** -1.237***
(0.237) (0.235) (0.236)
Middle East and North Africa 2.447*** 2.586*** 2.552***
(0.210) (0.212) (0.211)
South Asia -0.978*** -0.869*** -0.998***
(0.208) (0.210) (0.209)
Sub-Saharan Africa -0.436* -0.389* -0.378
(0.237) (0.237) (0.237)
Energy 2.785*** 2.882*** 2.753***
(0.183) (0.183) (0.182)
Telecom 6.187*** 6.211*** 6.101***
(0.259) (0.260) (0.261)
Water sewerage -1.718*** -1.585*** -1.869***
(0.230) (0.226) (0.231)
Total investment -0.0732** -0.0860*** -0.101***
(0.0316) (0.0315) (0.0316)
Age 0.279*** 0.284*** 0.281***
(0.0291) (0.0293) (0.0291)
Delay 0.211*** 0.224*** 0.204***
(0.0240) (0.0244) (0.0240)
Publicly Traded 2.539*** 2.000*** 2.210***
(0.854) (0.760) (0.793)
Greenfield -3.618*** -3.481*** -3.543***
(0.197) (0.196) (0.196)
Host government ownership -1.274*** -1.253*** -1.236***
(0.148) (0.150) (0.148)
Host country POLCONV -0.470 -0.129 -0.488
(0.308) (0.315) (0.309)
GDP 0.341*** 0.297*** 0.352***
(0.0533) (0.0546) (0.0538)
GDP growth 0.0189 0.0232 0.0148
(0.0147) (0.0150) (0.0148)
Unemployment -0.0701*** -0.0682*** -0.0719***
(0.0114) (0.0113) (0.0113)
Local investor 0.457** 0.661*** 0.551***
(0.187) (0.193) (0.188)
Climate risk -7.60e-05*** -8.45e-05*** -7.95e-05***
(4.36e-06) (5.16e-06) (4.61e-06)
Climate risk*Host government ownership 0.000120***
(1.79e-05)
Climate risk*Total investment 9.81e-06***
(1.87e-06)
Constant -2.228*** -2.111*** -2.227***
(0.609) (0.623) (0.611)
Log likelihood -1380.04*** -1352.60*** --1369.39***
Pseudo R2 69.48 70.09 69.72
Observations 18,846 18,846 18,846
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

































































Figure 2. Average marginal effects of government ownership at various levels of climate 
risk
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